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Tibet shown as part of the People’s Republic of China.1 
 
Close up of Tibetan territory.2 
                                               
 1 Tibet at a Glance, INT’L TIBET NETWORK, https://tibetnetwork.org/about-
tibet/tibet-at-a-glance/. 
 2 Tibet Travel Maps, EXPLORE TIBET (Apr. 19, 2019, 12:45 PM), 
https://www.exploretibet.com/m/maps/. 
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I.      INTRODUCTION 
This paper explores the histories and complexities of two states 
that have struggled for independence from the People’s Republic of 
China (“PRC”) and how, despite having vastly different histories and 
cultures, Tibet stands as an omen for things to come in Hong Kong. 
The paper will show that both states have the right under international 
law to become independent states, should they choose to do so, and 
that their occupations are illegal. These two states symbolize the 
struggle for self-determination in the post-colonial world, the same 
logic and international laws can be applied to millions of others who 
live in oppression under the rule of the world’s powers. This paper 
analyses the arguments for independence and the possible paths to 
independence. 
Despite Chinese propaganda claiming otherwise, Genghis 
Khan was Mongolian, not Chinese, and had conquered China; his 
grandson Kublai Khan created the Yuan Dynasty.3 Throughout its long 
history, Tibet had been an independent nation several times, but was 
conquered by Genghis Khan and later by the Qing Dynasty.4 Hong 
Kong had been a colony under British rule but was an uninhabited land 
prior to the British takeover.5 
Tibet was independent of foreign control from 1911-1950, 
with Tibet’s head of state (the thirteenth Dalai Lama at the time) 
formally declaring independence on February 13, 1913.6 I will show 
that under international law, as defined by the Montevideo 
Convention, Tibet meets the requirements of statehood.7 A “state” has 
                                               
 3 See PAUL LOCOCO, JR., GENGHIS KHAN vii-viii (2008). 
 4 WARREN W. SMITH JR., TIBETAN NATION: A HISTORY OF TIBETAN 
NATIONALISM AND SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS 124–25 (1997). 
 5 STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 59 (2004). 
 6 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 813 (1989). 
 7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 201 cmt. h (“Whether an entity satisfies the requirements of 
statehood is ordinarily determined by others states when they decide whether to treat 
that entity as a state”) cmt. 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (herein referred to as 
RESTATEMENT 3D); LORI FISLER DAMROSCH AND SEAN D. MURPHY, 
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a set of rights, including sovereignty over its territory and general 
authority over its nationals, status of a legal person, with capacity to 
own, acquire, and transfer property, to make contracts and enter into 
international agreements, to become a member of international 
organizations, and to pursue, and be subject to legal remedies, and 
capacity to join with other states to make international law or by 
international agreement.8 
After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the 1914 Simla Convention 
was agreed upon between Great Britain, China, and Tibet.9 Under this 
convention, Tibet was to be split into Tibet and Outer Tibet; Outer 
Tibet would be under Chinese suzerainty, meaning it would be 
internally self-run, but internationally would fall under Chinese rule.10 
Under Article 2 of the convention: 
The Governments of Great Britain and China 
recognizing that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, 
and recognizing also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, 
engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, 
and to abstain from interference in the administration 
of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation 
of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of 
the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. The Government 
of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese 
province.11 
In 1842, Hong Kong was ceded to the British Empire as a 
result of the first Opium War, with more territory ceded by China in 
1860 after the second Opium War. Finally, a section called the “New 
Territories,” 368 square miles north of Hong Kong on the Kowloon 
                                               
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 283 (2014); Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights of States, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. 
 8 See RESTATEMENT 3D § 206. 
 9 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 75 (1989). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
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Peninsula, was leased to the British for ninety-nine years in 1898.12 
Hong Kong had a population of roughly 7,450 when the British first 
took control of the territory. Hong Kong’s population skyrocketed 
through the years and now sits at 7.4 million.13 
The Republic of China existed until 1949, when the leaders of 
the government fled Mainland China to Taiwan, setting up the de jure 
government there.14 The communist People’s Republic of China 
(“PRC”), led by Mao Zedong, became the de facto government of 
Mainland China, and demanded the world view Taiwan as part of the 
PRC, and advocated a “one China” policy.15 In 1959, the Tibetan 
government fell to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”), 
Mao Zedong’s communist armed forces, causing the Dalai Lama and 
other governmental officials to flee the country and set up the de jure 
Tibetan government in India.16 
It is of the utmost importance that states recognize Tibet as an 
independent state and call for its power of sovereignty to be restored; 
every day that passes, more are imprisoned in Tibet, the culture is 
diminished, and China’s claim over Tibet grows as Tibetans intermarry 
with the Han Chinese.17 Recognition as a state is determined by others 
states in the world, as well as the United Nations.18 Further, recognition 
of a state, as a public act, is an optional and political act; unfortunately, 
                                               
 12 See STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 38 (2004); see 
TSANG, at 35; PATRICIA LIM, FORGOTTEN SOULS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
HONG KONG CEMETERY 544 (2011). 
 13 Census and statistics department, Population, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION (Feb. 28, 2019, 5:03 PM), 
https://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/so20.jsp. 
 14 STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 152 (2004). 
 15 Id. 
 16 See JIANGLIN LI, TIBET IN AGONY 194–95 (2016). 
 17 Xu Yangjingjing, China promotes mixed marriages in Tibet as way to achieve 




 18 RESTATEMENT 3D § 202. 
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there is no legal duty for any state to take this step.19 However, there 
was a precedent set by the UN Security Council in 1990 when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait: annexation of land under any form and whatever 
pretext has no legal validity and is considered null and void.20 Since 
1929, when the Kellogg-Briand Pact, also signed by China, came into 
force, a land title acquired through the use of force, including military 
force, is considered to be illegal under International Law.21 The pact 
was solidified under International law by Article 2, section 4 of the UN 
Charter, denouncing the use of force.22 In addition, Article 52 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which many regard as a 
solidification of existing Customary International Law, states that a 
treaty that is “procured by the threat or use of force” is void, meaning 
any treaty signed during the 1950 occupation of Tibet is not binding.23 
In 1950, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (“PLA”) 
marched in to Chamdo, the capitol of the Tibetan Autonomous region 
(“TAR”) and forced the leaders to sign the Seventeen Point Agreement 
which ceded Tibetan sovereignty and power to the Peoples’ Republic 
of China and Chairman Mao.24 According to accepted International 
Law principles, a treaty or agreement between states is void if it was 
made under duress, thus the Seventeen Point Agreement is invalid 
under international law as it was made under duress.25 China was bound 
by the UN Charter at the time of the annexation of Tibet.26 According 
                                               
 19 LORI FISLER DAMROSCH AND SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 287 (2014), quoting BROWNLIE CRAWFORD, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (8th ed. 2012). 
 20 See Security Council Resolution Concerning Iraq’s Attempted Annexation 
of Kuwait S.C. Res. 662 (Aug. 9, 1990). 
 21 See LORI FISLER DAMROSCH AND SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 364 (2014). 
 22 See U.N. Charter art. 2, § 4. 
 23 See generally LORI FISLER DAMROSCH AND SEAN D. MURPHY, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 364 (2014). 
 24 WARREN W. SMITH, TIBETAN NATION: A HISTORY OF TIBETAN 
NATIONALISM AND SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS 294 (1996). 
 25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 69. May 23, 1969, 1155, 
U.N.T.S. 331; See id.; See WARREN W. SMITH, TIBETAN NATION: A HISTORY OF 
TIBETAN NATIONALISM AND SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS 294 (1996). 
 26 See LORI FISLER DAMROSCH AND SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 362–66 (2014). 
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to Article 2, section 4 of the Charter, the use of force at the Battle of 
Chamdo, which led to the annexation of Tibet, was illegal.27 
Hong Kong was officially handed over to the Peoples’ 
Republic of China in 1997 through the “Sino-British Joint 
Declaration”28 in May 1985, with the express provision that the 
Capitalist economic system of Hong Kong remain in place until 2047, 
or fifty years after the handover.29 At that point Hong Kong will 
become fully absorbed into the Chinese Communist system.30 China 
has broken the Sino-British Joint Declaration by its suppression of 
democratic movements in Hong Kong, the censorship of local media, 
and the crackdown of the pro-independence Umbrella movement.31 
Although Hong Kong’s position is unique, there is little doubt that the 
history of Tibet offers a glimpse of what is in store for Hong Kong 
upon the eventual change into the authoritative Chinese Communist 
system. 
Hong Kong has independently developed a separate culture, 
economic and legal systems with a diverse identity separate from 
Mainland China.32 International Law gives Hong Kong the right to 
sovereignty and self-determination due to its unique “people,” culture, 
language, set of boundaries, and the ability to govern.33 Under 
International Law, China has no right to either Tibet or Hong Kong; 
                                               
 27 See Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, art. 69. May 23, 1969, 1155, 
U.N.T.S. 331; See WARREN W. SMITH, TIBETAN NATION: A HISTORY OF TIBETAN 
NATIONALISM AND SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS 294 (1996). 
 28 See STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 225–26 (2004). 
 29 Id. at 226. 
 30 Id. 
 31 AFP-JIJI, Thousands Protest in Hong Kong over China suppression, JAPAN TIMES 
(Feb. 28, 2019, 5:29 PM) https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/01/asia-
pacific/thousands-protest-hong-kong-china-suppression/#.XG2sveHYrnE; Carole 
J. Petersen, Prohibiting the Hong Kong National Party: Has Hong Kong violated the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights?, 48 H.K.L.J. 789, 790 (2018); 
Associated Press, Human rights in China under Xi Jinping ‘worst since Tiananmen crackdown’: 
Amnesty, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 28, 2019, 4:15 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120318/human-
rights-china-under-xi-jinping-worst-tiananmen. 
 32 STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 193 (2004). 
 33 LORI FISLER DAMROSCH AND SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 283 (2014). 
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these autonomous regions have the right to self-determination, and 
should be independent, free states.34 In Part I of this article, I will prove 
this thesis by giving a brief background history of both Hong Kong 
and Tibet with enough detail to show their independent historical 
nature. In Part II, I will compare Tibet and Hong Kong, explain the 
international law principles guiding my paper, and give examples of 
other instances in which international law is followed under similar 
circumstances to Tibet and Hong Kong. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.   Tibet 
1. History thru Independence 
“After eating the mountain, hunger is not satiated. After 
drinking the ocean, thirst is not quenched.”35 
The Tibetan ethnic group differentiated from the Han Chinese 
sometime in the second millennium BCE.36 The first conflicts between 
the Han Chinese and ethnic Tibetans can be traced back to as early as 
206 BCE.37 By 638 CE, Tibet began solidifying as an empire, with 
200,000 soldiers sent to the border with China to ward off attacks.38 
The Tibetan state, as headed by the Dalai Lama, was founded in the 
mid-seventeenth century under the system of “religion and 
government joined together (chösi nyiden in Tibetan).”39 The fifth Dalai 
Lama enlisted the help of Gushri Khan from the Qoshot Mongol 
group to defend the Red Hat sect of Tibetan monks and unify the 
country.40 In 1642, the fifth Dalai Lama became the ruler of Tibet 
                                               
 34 See id. 
 35 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 344 (1989). 
 36 WARREN W. SMITH, TIBETAN NATION: A HISTORY OF TIBETAN 
NATIONALISM AND SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS 17 (1996). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 61. 
 39 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 1 (2007). 
 40 Id. 
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receiving the title from the Mongol chief Altan Khan; where Dalai 
means “ocean” in Mongolian and Lama—”spiritual master” in 
Tibetan.41 The leader of the country, the Dalai Lama, is recruited by 
reincarnation—the Dalai Lama incarnates his essence into the fetus of 
a Tibetan boy.42 The current Dalai Lama is now eighty-three years old, 
which is well beyond the average life expectancy of an adult male. 
When the Dalai Lama dies, the process for selecting a new Dalai Lama 
will be governed by the Chinese government.43 
Tibet was a pre-modern, theocratic society during its de facto 
rule between 1912-1950.44 Its leaders saw greatness in Tibet because of 
their rejection of modern institutions such as public schools and a 
standing professional army.45 Tibet was unique in its spiritual devotion, 
at one point as much as twenty-six percent of the male population were 
monks.46 In 1721, the Qing Dynasty conquered Tibet, leaving the Dalai 
Lama as a symbolic spiritual leader, and established the council of 
leaders—the Kashag.47 In 1903, the British saw Tibet as a key trading 
area due to its location between China, Russia, and India, and pressed 
Tibet into open relations.48 The Tibetans initially refused but were 
easily defeated by the British army, leading to the signing of a trade 
agreement in September 1904.49 Tibet had operated with semi-
autonomy during the Qing dynasty rule but saw the British invasion as 
an opportunity to move away from Chinese rule and come under 
British protection.50 The Chinese became fearful of losing territory and 
                                               
 41 Id. at 1–2. 
 42 Id. at 2. 




 44 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 2 (1989). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 21. 
 47 WARREN W. SMITH JR., TIBETAN NATION: A HISTORY OF TIBETAN 
NATIONALISM AND SINO-TIBETAN RELATIONS, 124–25 (1997). 
 48 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 45 (1989). 
 49 Id. 
 50 See Id. at 45–46. 
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made attempts to bring eastern Tibet (Kham) under direct rule, ending 
the semi-autonomy they once enjoyed.51 As a result, taxes now flowed 
directly to the Chinese government, instead of the Tibetan chiefs; 
monasteries were abolished; and all inhabitants became subject to 
Chinese law.52 
In 1911, the Chinese Nationalists rebelled against the Qing 
dynasty.53 When the news reached Lhasa, the capitol city of Tibet, a 
secret war department was formed and Tibet openly rebelled.54 In 
1912, the remaining 3,000 Chinese troops in Tibet surrendered and 
were expelled to India.55 The Dalai Lama issued a proclamation 
announcing his return to Lhasa.56 The proclamation also addressed 
several other issues such as tax collections and a warning that that 
Tibetans would need to defend their land against foreign invasion.57 
Although it is not explicitly stated, this written statement was seen as a 
declaration of independence.58 The proclamation stated that the Dalai 
Lama desired freedom for Tibet and showed his intention to rule the 
country without Chinese interference.59 In 1913, China and Tibet 
agreed to tripartite talks, called the Simla talks, with Britain.60 The 
Tibetan position, as stated to the Chinese and British, was that 
Tibet and China have never been under each other and 
will never associate with each other in the future. It is 
decided that Tibet is an independent state and that the 
precious Protector, the Dalai Lama, is the ruler of 
Tibet, in all temporal as well as in spiritual affairs.61 
                                               
 51 Id. at 46. 
 52 Id. at 47. 
 53 Id. at 58. 
 54 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 59 (1989). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 60–61. 
 57 Id. at 61. 
 58 Id. at 62. 
 59 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 62 (1989). 
 60 Id. at 69. 
 61 Id. at 70. 
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The terms of the Simla Convention of 1914 split Tibet into 
Outer Tibet, which would be autonomous and run by the Tibetan 
government, and Inner Tibet, which would ban all Chinese troops 
from entering the territory but still remaining under Chinese rule.62 The 
representatives of Tibet and Britain signed, and the Chinese 
plenipotentiary eventually initialed the draft.63 The Chinese 
government was willing to allow Outer Tibet’s status but was unwilling 
to agree to a border where they would lose Chamdo.64 In 1917, a 
conflict broke out in Kham when the Chinese military invaded.65 The 
Tibetan army successfully recaptured Chamdo defeating the Chinese.66 
The Tibetans and Chinese signed a truce in 1918 moving the border 
that had been set by the Simla Treaty eastward to the Upper Yangtze 
River (modern day Szechuan province) and increasing the recognized 
Tibetan territory.67 
2. Struggle to Remain Independent 
By 1928, the Nationalists took control of China declaring it the 
Republic of China (“ROC”).68 The official stance of the ROC was that 
the empire was comprised of the Han people along with four minority 
nationalities: the Manchus, the Mongolians, the Tibetans, and the 
Muslims of Xinjiang.69 During the government’s inauguration, the 
Chinese government still held this view despite Outer Mongolia, Tibet, 
and Manchuria operating independently with Xinjiang operating semi-
autonomously.70 President Chiang Kai-Shek sent an envoy to the Dalai 
Lama in 1928 to improve relations.71 The Dalai Lama responded with 
eight points to restore relations, which included: good faith on the part 
of the Chinese government, a return of Tibetan districts from China, 
                                               
 62 Id. at 75–76. 
 63 Id. at 75. 
 64 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 75 (1989). 
 65 Id. at 83. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 213. 
 69 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 213 (1989). 
 70 Id. at 213–14. 
 71 Id. at 215. 
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and a meeting to mend the discord.72 The Chinese drafted a response 
with ten points of their own, but the peace talks ended abruptly when 
the Chief of Beri, a town near the Chinese border in modern Gardze 
County, seized the estates of a lama in Kham.73 The actions were 
supported by a Chinese commander and a Chinese General, along with 
the supporters of the Panchen Lama (an important religious figure in 
Tibet who had conspired against the thirteenth Dalai Lama in India).74 
Tibetan troops were sent and badly defeated the Chinese troops before 
negotiations could begin, pushing the Chinese as far as Tachienlu (just 
outside of modern-day Chengdu).75 A truce was signed by the Tibetan 
and Chinese parties with the Yangtze River affirmed as the border 
between the two countries in October 1932.76 
A little more than a year later, the thirteenth Dalai Lama died 
on December 17, 1933.77 The ROC continued negotiations with Tibet, 
attempting to bring them “back to the motherland.”78 In the meantime, 
the search team conducted several tests and declared that it had found 
the fourteenth Dalai Lama and brought him to Lhasa in 1939.79 
In 1943, the British reviewed the status of Tibet in the eyes of 
Her Majesty’s Government, changing a 1921 memorandum to say 
“Tibet is an autonomous region under the suzerainty of China.”80 The 
proposal of the British Foreign Office to make the change of Tibet’s 
status was sent to the India office, suggesting not to issue public or 
diplomatic statements, but no longer mentioning Chinese suzerainty 
over Tibet.81 In June of 1944, US Vice President Henry A. Wallace 
made a joint press release with Chiang Kai-Shek recognizing the 
“fundamental right of presently dependent Asiatic peoples to self-
                                               
 72 Id. at 216–18. 
 73 Id. at 221. 
 74 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 221 (1989). 
 75 Id. at 222. 
 76 Id. at 223. 
 77 Id. at 141–42. 
 78 See Id. at 224–39. 
 79 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 319–20 (1989). 
 80 Id. at 397. 
 81 Id. at 399. 
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government.”82 The joint statement gave hope to the Tibetans for 
having a fully recognized de jure government.83 In April of 1945, Chiang 
Kai-Shek sent a gift of weapons and ammunition to Tibet with a note 
stating that China would support Tibet free of cost.84 By the end of 
World War II, China signed the treaty of Soviet-Chinese friendship, 
which forced it to recognize Outer Mongolia’s independence.85 The 
National Assembly of Tibet issued a nine-point statement in 1946 to 
China clarifying what it had stated several times in the past, showing 
that its position was unchanged: Tibet was “an independent state, 
managing its own domestic and foreign, civil and military affairs.”86 
In 1948, the Tibetans sent a trade mission to the USA and UK 
in an effort to solidify their international standing.87 After the trade 
team left Tibet and entered India using Chinese passports, the Tibetans 
switched to Tibetan passports, which were validated by the US when 
the Tibetans left Hong Kong for Honolulu.88 The trade mission forced 
the US to reexamine its position on Tibet.89 The new position, due to 
the impending Communist takeover of China, was to maintain friendly 
relations with Tibet short of offending the Chinese.90 
On November 2, 1949, the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Bureau 
sent a letter to Chairman Mao requesting an assurance that no Chinese 
troops would cross the Sino-Tibetan border, or take any military 
action, and stated that Tibet was “from earliest times up to now” an 
independent country “whose political administration had never been 
taken over by an [sic] Foreign Country.”91 
                                               
 82 Id. at 409. 
 83 Id. 
 84 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 535 (1989). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 541. 
 87 Id. at 570. 
 88 Id. at 583. 
 89 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 607 (1989). 
 90 Id. at 607–9. 
 91 Id. at 623. 
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In October 1949, the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) took 
control of the Chinese government, emphasizing the “liberation” of 
Tibet and promising to reintegrate Tibet with the motherland.92 A 
month prior, the new Chinese ambassador from the PRC met with 
Tibetan representatives to discuss the Tibetan position.93 “The 
Tibetans began the negotiations by reiterating their traditional position, 
assuring him that there was no need to liberate Tibet from imperialism 
since Tibet was ruled and protected by the Dalai Lama, not by any 
foreign power.”94 The Tibetan representatives were handed a pamphlet 
with the PRC’s position and were explained that three points were 
critical: Tibet must accept that it is part of China, Tibet’s defense must 
be handled by China, and all political and trade matters concerning 
foreign countries must be conducted through China.95 The Chinese 
ambassador bluntly stated that Tibet must accept these three 
conditions or there would be war.96 While the negotiations began 
between the PRC and the Tibetan government, the PLA advanced 
“day and night” through Khyungpo and Nangchen, then attacking 
Riwoche.97 Tibetan forces suffered “heavy losses” near the Yangtze 
River and were forced to retreat.98 “In Chamdo, the impending disaster 
quickly became apparent as word started arriving from fleeing district 
officials and soldiers of the Chinese victories at Gamto Druga, 
Rangsumdo, Markham, and so on.”99 The scene in Chamdo at seven 
AM on October eigteenth was described as: “panic was already 
breaking out in the town. People were running in all directions, 
carrying or dragging their personal belongings. . . . Then a small band 
of Khamba levies (soldiers) came running past, shouting angrily and 
looking murderous.”100 After Chamdo fell, the Chinese ambassador 
                                               
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 675. 
 94 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 675 (1989). 
 95 Id. at 676. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 690. 
 98 Id. 
 99 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 691–92 (1989). 
 100 MELVYN C. GOLDSTEIN, A HISTORY OF MODERN TIBET: THE DEMISE 
OF THE LAMAIST STATE, 1913-1951 693 (1989). It is at this point I am reminded of 
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blamed the attacks on the Tibetans for not going to Peking to 
negotiate.101 
On October 29th, 1950, Tibet asked India to appeal to the 
United Nations on their behalf, India said Tibet should appeal directly 
and that India would support it.102 In the appeal to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations, Tibet made several relevant 
international law arguments.103 Tibet argued that Chinese conduct split 
Tibet permanently from China in 1910, and that the thirteenth Dalai 
Lama declared complete independence in 1911-12.104 Tibet stated that 
it never acceded to the Chinese claim of suzerainty in 1914 and that 
China was forbidden to meddle in the affairs of Lhasa.105 Tibet 
conceded that because China did not sign the 1914 Simla Accords the 
terms of the agreement are not enforceable upon the country, but the 
Accords still guide relations between India, China, Britain, and Tibet.106 
Tibet’s position, as well as my own, is that because of Tibet’s 
autonomous nature, its several treaties with numerous foreign states, 
and the thirty-nine years of sovereignty, Tibet’s independence has de 
jure status.107 
As long as the people of Tibet are compelled by force 
to become a part of China against the will and consent 
of her people, the present invasion of Tibet will be the 
grossest instance of the violation of the weak by the 
strong. We therefore appeal through you to the nations 
of the world to intercede in our behalf and restrain 
Chinese aggression.108 
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On November 14th, 1950, the chairman of El Salvador’s 
delegation requested that the invasion of Tibet be added to the U.N. 
general committee’s agenda based on the UN’s responsibility to 
maintain international peace and stability.109 The British Foreign Office 
relayed clear instructions to the British representative to support Tibet 
and support the Tibetan appeal.110 Once U.N. General Committee 
discussion was opened to the floor, the British representative, 
Younger, stated he did not think he could participate in the discussion 
of Tibet and that Britain was unclear of the legal status of Tibet.111 
There exists no evidence he was ever told to say that aside from India 
wanting to prevent the UN debate.112 India was in the process of 
freeing itself from Britain and began to strengthen ties to China, 
despite its previous devotion to Tibet.113 India claimed it doubted 
Tibet’s claim of sovereignty, which was a result of Chinese influence, 
and pushed for Tibet and China to continue negotiations without U.N. 
involvement.114 Younger’s procedural postponement was followed by 
India claiming that the UN should abandon the issue because the 
Chinese had stopped their advance on Lhasa and that India was certain 
of a peaceful settlement, despite there being abundant evidence to the 
contrary.115 
The negotiations began in 1951 between the PRC and the 
Tibetan representatives.116 The talks began on a strange note when the 
Chinese representative asked if the Tibetans accepted the young man 
the Chinese chose as the Panchen Lama, an extremely important role 
in the Tibetan religion.117 The Lhasa government, reluctantly and under 
extreme duress, announced the new Panchen Lama as the one chosen 
by the Chinese in order to secure peace.118 During the rest of the 
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negotiations, whenever the Tibetans wanted to discuss any of the 
issues in the proposed agreements, the Chinese representative would 
get annoyed and threaten, “do you want peaceful liberation or 
liberation by force?”119 Within two weeks, a seventeen-point agreement 
was signed with no discussion of various sections.120 Moreover, the 
Chinese delegation lied about the interpretations of each point and 
made false promises for some of the points.121 The Tibetan delegation 
never received approval through the Lhasa government for an 
agreement that recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, for the first 
time ever in Tibet’s history.122 A few days after the announcement of 
the seventeen-point plan, the US Secretary of State sent a telegraph to 
the US ambassador to India, Loy W. Henderson, that Tibet should not 
be compelled by duress to accept a violation of its autonomy.123 
Distinguished social anthropologist and Tibet expert, Professor 
Melvyn Goldstein concluded this chapter of his book on Tibet by 
saying: 
Tibet had become a part of the people’s republic of 
China. In the next few months, several thousand 
troops of the people’s liberation army arrived in Lhasa; 
although the old system continued to exist in some 
form or another for 8 more years, October 1951 marks 
the end of the de facto independent Lamaist state. Tibet 
had struggled for four decades to attain an 
internationally recognized status as fully autonomous 
or independent, but in the end it felt compelled to 
accept Chinese sovereignty, with the hope of 
preserving the essence of its social, political, and 
religious system.124 
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3. Annexed by the People’s Republic of China 
I look back towards the memories of my young days, 
and they still stand before me, vivid and clear as the 
crystal streams of my land Nyarong. It was beautiful 
land, and the lives we lead there, those simple and hard, 
were happy. Then the Chinese came. At first with soft 
words and bright silver and later with guns and death. 
They took away my fields, my animals and my home. 
they looted, desecrated and burnt the temples and 
monasteries I worshipped in. Like vermin, they slew 
my friends, relatives, lamas, and all the people dear to 
my heart. On a frozen wasteland, thinly covered with 
wind-swept snow, I left behind me the twisted, bullet-
ridden carcasses of my family and my only little 
daughter.125 
 
Clearly, Tibet wanted to remain independent from China.126 
What is less clear is why China, specifically Mao Zedong, wanted to 
annex Tibet. Many historians have attempted to answer this question, 
the two most cited reasons are national honor and the geopolitical 
significance of Tibet for China’s national security.127 China had become 
weak due to corruptness of previous Chinese regimes, and it became a 
focal point to restore sovereignty and control over all territory held by 
the Qing dynasty to erase the national humiliation suffered during the 
British invasion of Tibet in 1903.128 Beijing considered Tibet’s split 
from China as a part of British imperialism, and believed Tibet’s desire 
for independence from China was due to British support for Tibetan 
autonomy.129 Thus, “restoring” Tibet to the People’s Republic of China 
had deep nationalistic and symbolic value, to such an extent that 
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modern Chinese intellectuals called the annexation of Tibet a “peaceful 
liberation.”130 In 1954, an internal Chinese Communist party document 
was released illustrating its perspective and discussing issues within 
Tibet: 
Tibet and the motherland have had a close, inseparable 
relationship since a long time ago. Tibet is one part of 
the territory of our great motherland. How-ever, after 
the Republican Revolution (1911), Tibet’s rulers, who 
were con-trolled and manipulated by imperialists, 
abandoned the motherland and went to rely on the 
imperialists. To a great extent, imperialists controlled 
Tibet, signed unfair treaties and gained great privilege 
in the spheres of politics, eco-nomics, and military. 
Also, they took numerous pieces of territory from the 
bor-der area of Tibet. Because of the development of 
the anti-imperialist struggle of the entire Chinese 
people and the existence of an anti-imperialist force 
within the Tibetan nationality (among them, including 
a part of the upper-class lamas and aristocrats), they 
failed to conquer the whole of Tibet. During this 
period of time, Tibet was semi-colonial, and mainly 
took an independent attitude toward us.131 
 
Mao Zedong alluded to his personal feelings that Tibet was 
necessary for China’s national security when he commented on the 
subject in a discussion with the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama in 1954, 
stating, “now that the Tibetans are cooperating with the Han, our 
national defense line is not the Upper Yangtze River but the Himalayan 
Mountains.”132 
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Yet, the resistance to China’s annexation of Tibet continued. 
By early March of 1959, there were Tibetans openly fighting the 
Chinese PLA, erecting fortifications on major highways.133 In a letter 
secretly written by Mao on March fifteenth, the Dalai Lama was told 
to come to the PLA’s Military Area Command for his safety, though 
there is little doubt that the Dalai Lama would have been executed had 
he gone.134 On March 17, 1959, the Dalai Lama fled with most of his 
officials to India.135 In the two years that followed, about 80,000 
Tibetans fled to India, Bhutan, and Nepal.136 Two shells were fired by 
PRC militiamen, which landed in a pond near where the Dalai Lama 
was staying in Norbulingka.137 Due to large crowds standing near 
Norbulingka to protect the Dalai Lama from the Chinese PLA, the 
Dalai Lama reasoned that since he was fleeing, the people could 
disperse, thus preventing a bloodbath.138 The Battle of Lhasa began on 
March 19th and within a day, trucks were called in to haul away the 
mountains of corpses that created a “river of blood.”139 The aristocrats 
that followed the Dalai Lama out were “wary of the draconian 
Communist reforms,” and they felt they needed to ensure the Dalai 
Lama’s safety for the future of Tibet.140 Beijing was notified two days 
later of the escape, despite several attempts by the PRC to claim they 
intentionally let the Dalai Lama flee.141 By March twenty-second, the 
fighting was over, and Lhasa had fallen.142 The Tibetan government 
was formally dissolved by the Chinese government on March 28th, 
1959.143 
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The Cultural Revolution reached Tibet in 1966, destroying all 
but roughly 500 of the 2,676 monasteries.144 In March 2008, protests 
broke out in 100 Tibetan counties, some in modern Qinghai and 
Szechuan, due to the failure of the six-year negotiations between the 
Dalai Lama and the Chinese government.145 Some of the other factors 
included the influx of Han Chinese, political repression, cultural 
assimilation, and economic marginalization.146 The Chinese 
government responded with undeclared martial law with over a 
thousand people disappeared, arbitrary detention, and more than two-
hundred dead.147 Lobsand Sangay, a native Tibetan from Kham who 
fought against the Chinese in the 1959 Tibetan uprising, characterized 
it as “the Chinese government’s draconian response echoed its historic 
reactions to unrest in Tibet.”148 
B.   Hong Kong 
1. History through 1897 
Hong Kong was the product of the First Anglo-Chinese War 
(1839-42), also known as the first Opium War, between China and 
Great Britain.149 The reasons for the war are long and complicated, but 
in large part the war resulted from the belief in China that its shortage 
of silver was due to the opium trade with British India.150 Along with 
the opium trade causing disharmony between China and Great Britain, 
the Chinese saw the British as barbarians, while the British saw the 
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Chinese and Chinese law as “primitive, arbitrary, and barbaric.”151 The 
racism seen by both the Chinese and British caused both sides to seek 
a solution to legal dilemmas.152 Due to the opium epidemic that was 
spreading throughout China, Chinese officials created a plan in which 
trade would collapse in Canton (where trade with Britain took place) 
to create a commercial panic among the British so they would sacrifice 
the opium trade for other commerce.153 Unfortunately, opium was the 
most profitable item being traded between China and Britain, so when 
a Chinese official named Lin Zexu ordered the foreigner merchants to 
surrender the opium and to stop shipping opium into the country, 
Prime Minister Lord Melbourne responded to the loss of £2 million 
of opium by declaring that China needed to repay Britain for the loss 
of goods under threat of force.154 Four thousand British troops, sixteen 
warships and twenty-eight transports were sent to China resulting in 
the Imperial Court sending Qi Shan, a senior official, to negotiate for 
peace.155 Oxford historian Steve Tsang described the events: 
The British again forced Qi to come to an agreement 
after a further display of naval superiority. Qi had no 
choice and reached a tentative agreement with Charles 
Elliot, known as the Chuenpi Convention. By this 
agreement, the island of Hong Kong was to be ceded 
to the British; an indemnity of six million silver dollars 
was to be paid over six years; official relations between 
the two empires was to be direct and on equal footing 
and trade was to be reopened immediately. As a result, 
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the British took possession of Hong Kong and British 
rule began on 26 January 1841.156  
Both the British and Chinese governments were dissatisfied by 
the treaty terms, and the war continued until the Treaty of Nanking 
was signed on August 29, 1842, with the final act on June 26, 1843, 
giving the British Crown control of Hong Kong.157 
When the British took the island of Hong Kong, it was “merely 
a peripheral of Xinan county” without a place in the formal 
government.158 The birth of the modern city of Hong Kong began after 
British occupation with the influx of merchants who felt protected by 
the British flag, an influx of Chinese nationals who were hired as 
laborers for the building of a new town, and other colonists.159 The 
British had to create an entire society from scratch, establishing a new 
legal and judicial system that would function for a mix of Westerners 
and the poor, uneducated laborers from Mainland China who were 
often on the fringe of society.160 The island itself only contained a few 
thousand fisherman and farmers, which made incorporating the local 
population difficult due to the language barrier and a lack of politicians 
and scholars.161 The British permitted the local Chinese to live by their 
own customs and law, unless they conflicted with British common 
law.162 Although this led to substantially harsher sentences for Chinese 
locals, it created a unique legal environment with dual systems in 
place.163 Because of the increase in population, the infrastructure, and 
the amount of work that had been done, a man named Pottinger 
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reported to London, “this settlement had already advanced too far to 
admit of its ever being restored to the authority of the Emperor.”164 
The English rule of law eventually took root in Hong Kong by the late 
1800’s, gradually accepted among the multi-cultural residents showing 
that Hong Kong was already growing apart from Mainland China.165 
The British believed that the Treaty of Nanking, which opened 
four additional ports in China, should have led to a great expansion of 
trade and profits.166 Not only did an expansion of profit not occur, the 
Chinese also denied British ships entry into Canton, and kept opium 
listed as contraband; this led to the second opium war from 1856-
1860.167 During the second opium war, the British took control of the 
tip of the Mainland opposite from Hong Kong island, an area known 
as Kowloon.168 Though Kowloon was originally leased in 1860 for 500 
silver dollars, the land south of modern Boundary Street was officially 
annexed as a result of the Convention of Peking later that year along 
with Stonecutter’s Island located to the west of Kowloon.169 In the 
1880s, several commanders in the local garrison in Hong Kong 
requested the British War Office to expand their territory in Hong 
Kong to include the entire peninsula.170 Although China posed no 
military threat to Hong Kong, the local advocates relied on 
hypotheticals to convince the authorities in London of the need for 
the Northern Territories of Kowloon peninsula.171 Though there was a 
need for land for have military exercises, military barracks, and space 
for cemeteries, a large driving force was the need for land speculators 
to make money from the land.172 By 1898, 1.5% of Britain’s exports 
went to China, but Britain’s share of China’s trade was “larger than 
that of the rest of the world combined” with sixty-two percent of 
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China’s exports going to Britain.173 Due to the economic 
considerations and to ensure Britain’s economic superiority in China, 
it was in Britain’s economic interests to keep China open to free trade 
and not antagonize the Chinese by taking more land.174 When the 
French acquired a ninety-nine-year lease of Canton Bay (modern 
Zhanjiang) 210 miles away from Hong Kong, the British responded by 
acquiring a ninety-nine-year lease for the New Territories in 1898, 
roughly 370 square miles south of the Shenzhen River, along with 230 
separate islands, completing the territory of what we call modern Hong 
Kong.175 
The only argument for the leased extension was that of defense 
despite no other country posing a military threat to Hong Kong at the 
turn of the century.176 British forces hadn’t built any significant 
fortifications for decades after the lease went into effect, and ten 
months passed before the British even took possession of the New 
Territories.177 The historian Steve Tsang felt so strongly that the 
acquisition of New Territories lacked a real purpose that he 
characterized it as a “naked imperial expansion.”178 On October 20, 
1898, the British declared a Royal Order in Council (a decree in the 
name of the monarch), which defined the New Territories in the eyes 
of the British, stating that the New Territories were “part and parcel 
of Her Majesty’s Colony of Hong Kong in like manner and for all 
intents and purposes as if they had originally formed part of the said 
Colony.”179 The Royal Order stipulated that the New Territories would 
be a colony of the British empire for the duration of the lease, but in 
the eyes of many in the British empire, the New Territories were a part 
of Hong Kong as if they had annexed them.180 
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2. Hong Kong’s Development during the Colonial Years. 
The economy of Hong Kong, along with society in general, 
continued to develop freely.181 This free development was a result of 
the colonial government’s lack of resources.182 The colonial 
government was small and preferred not to be involved in local matters 
unless British “jurisdictions, interests, or values were at stake.”183 Hong 
Kong became an international center for trade in the eyes of Western 
traders for its access to British jurisdiction and policy makers.184 Hong 
Kong quickly became the choice for major traders’ regional offices or 
headquarters despite being smaller than Shanghai, with the businesses 
having strong ties to European, American, and Asian cities across the 
globe.185 By the 1850’s, Hong Kong became a thriving trading port 
between China and Thailand, the Malay peninsula, Indochina, and 
modern-day Indonesia.186 Trade in Hong Kong grew at an incredible 
pace, growing from 315 traders in 1876 to 395 traders in 1881.187 
Although the non-Chinese grew to only 1,600 by 1859, the Chinese 
community saw rapid growth, as Steve Tsang noted: 
With the Chinese community growing fast—rising 
from 7,500 in 1841 to 22,800 in 1847 and to 85,300 in 
1859—a meaningful domestic market emerged and 
grew, generating secondary economic activities and 
growth. By 1859, there were already 2,000 shops or 
enterprises owned or operated by the Chinese, 
including 278 traditional grocery stores, 49 stores for 
Western goods, 51 rice shops, 53 shipbuilders, 92 
carpenters, 116 metal workshops and others.188 
A distinct, multi-cultural society began to form in Hong Kong 
aside from the Chinese.189 Groups of Persians, Indians, and Portuguese 
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came to Hong Kong, mostly as traders, and “Eurasians,” usually the 
offspring of a European father and a Chinese mother, began to 
become part of the Chinese community.190 Although de jure segregation 
was enacted in 1888, it was legally ended in 1946.191 The colony of 
Hong Kong became so vastly different from Mainland China that it 
began influencing progressive-minded Chinese who visited to see a 
fully-functioning Western-style government.192 
Hong Kong’s existence also acted as an Alamo for many 
revolutionaries and reformers from China who sought an emergency 
exit.193 Many of China’s most vocal supporters for reform were from 
Hong Kong including the father of Chinese journalism, Wang Tao.194 
The supporters of reform used Hong Kong as a platform to expose 
“the corruption, inefficiency, and oppression of China’s gentry-
dominated ruling bureaucracy” and to advocate for China to be 
reorganized entirely.195 Key leaders of the 1898 reform movement in 
China, such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, were influenced by 
the British colony and Western learning.196 Liang Qichao visited Hong 
Kong in 1881 and admired the “orderliness, cleanliness, and legal basis 
for British rule.”197 
Hong Kong continued influencing Mainland China into the 
1900s when the idea of Republican Revolution was conceived in Hong 
Kong.198 Sun Yat-sen, the most important leader and ideologist of the 
Republican revolution, created and shaped the ideas behind the 
revolution after studying in Hong Kong.199 After organizing the 
XingZhonghui, or Revive China Society, in Hawaiʻi, the group 
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expanded dramatically when it opened a branch in Hong Kong.200 The 
first two uprisings for the Republican Revolution used Hong Kong as 
its base before the imperial government of China finally fell in 1912.201 
A week after the Wuchang uprising, where the Imperial Chinese 
government fell to revolutionaries, masses in Hong Kong attacked 
royalists who were flying the Chinese imperial flags.202 The mood and 
attitude of the locals of Hong Kong toward China was best captured 
by Governor Sir Fredrick Lugard who, when false news that Beijing 
had fallen to revolutionaries spread to Hong Kong, wrote “the entire 
Chinese populace appeared to become temporarily demented with joy. 
The din of crackers . . . was deafening and accompanied by perpetual 
cheering and flag-waving—a method of madness most unusual to the 
Chinese.”203 
By the end of the Great War (also called World War I), the 
population of Hong Kong had reached 598,100 ethnically Chinese and 
13,600 non-Chinese citizens.204 Just as the Chinese Republicans used 
Hong Kong as a launching point for attacks in South China, so did the 
Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) use Hong Kong to overthrow the 
authority figures in Canton in 1927.205 This did not last long, as the rise 
of the CCP’s influence, and the CCP’s organizing of labor strikes in 
the 1920’s, in Hong Kong gave the local police justification to deport 
CCP members back to the mainland, leading to a “bare skeleton” of 
CCP presence by 1932.206 Society continued to develop in Hong Kong 
with new technologies.207 Modern technology, such as automobiles, 
tramcars, and electricity, were first seen as “Western ways,” but were 
eventually accepted by the local Chinese community.208 Despite the 
Great Depression, there was a large growth in factories, from 403 
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factories in 1933 to 829 in 1938.209 The population continued to expand 
growing from its small 7,500 origin to an estimated 1.6 million in 
1941.210 
The reason why immigrants were coming to Hong Kong began 
to change around the time of the Japanese invasion of China in 1937.211 
Most travelled to Hong Kong in order to find work prior to 1937, but 
immigrants quickly morphed into refugees by 1939.212 Shortly after the 
bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese defeated the Hong Kong 
battalions in 1941.213 As a result of losing Hong Kong to Japan, Britain 
began negotiations with China over the leased New Territories in late 
1942.214 What was eventually agreed upon was that the Chinese foreign 
minister would have the right to raise the issue of the New Territories 
lease “for discussion at a later date.”215 Although historian Steve Tsang 
claims this is when “Britain accepted for the first time that there was a 
Hong Kong problem,” the discussion was formally over the leased 
New Territories.216 The horrors the locals faced at the hands of the 
Japanese were enough to reduce the population of Hong Kong to 
between 500,000-600,000 by the time the Japanese surrendered in 
1945.217 Despite having lost Hong Kong to the Japanese in WWII, 
Britain was staunchly determined to return.218 The feeling of retaking 
Hong Kong was so strong that Prime Minister Winston Churchill 
responded to a question over whether Britain would give Hong Kong 
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back to China with “over my dead body.”219 British officials felt that 
regaining sovereignty over Hong Kong was a matter of prestige and 
would help in future relations with China.220 By the end of the war, 
Britain cited three main reasons they had claim to Hong Kong: first, 
Britain had taken a small barren island and turned it into one of the 
world’s greatest ports, it was an important base for British merchants 
and industrialists doing business in China, and finally it was a point of 
national pride to restore Hong Kong to its normal state of order and 
prosperity.221 The British created a special naval task force to sail to 
Hong Kong on the day the Japanese surrendered.222 
By 1949, the Communists in China, led by Mao Zedong, had 
captured the Capital of Nanking (also spelled Nanjing), captured the 
financial center of Shanghai, and declared China to be the People’s 
Republic of China.223 Despite Mao stating several times that he had no 
interest in Hong Kong, Premier Zhou stated in 1972 that the issue of 
Hong Kong would be settled in 1997 when the lease of the New 
Territories would end; the PRC made no distinction between the lease 
of the New Territories and the land gained through the two Opium 
Wars (Kowloon and Hong Kong Island).224 
With Hong Kong’s trade, industry, and manufacturing 
increasing with the world, its share in China’s total trade fell from 
thirty-two percent in 1951 to five percent in 1959; Hong Kong was 
also falling in line with Western countries in the cold war.225 By the 
1970’s, the government had enough surplus saved from earlier 
austerity measures for huge social programs, infrastructure 
improvements, and free compulsory education.226 The rapid growth of 
the economy was matched by the population growth, with almost 6 
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million living in Hong Kong by 1990.227 Hong Kong entrepreneurs 
eventually started building firms in the PRC and by 1997, had 5 million 
employees in the PRC.228 The successes of the Hong Kong businesses, 
and their subsequent spread into the PRC, highlights the very cultural 
and societal differences that existed between the PRC and Hong 
Kong.229 Although the head of the PRC, Deng Xioaping, was 
reforming the communist economy towards more capitalist ideals, and 
although Guangdong improved the business environment, the PRC 
still disrupted businesses and production more than Hong Kong’s 
government.230 The Hong Kong entrepreneurs were able to clear the 
bureaucratic red tape of the PRC more easily than their mainland 
counterparts.231 
The business owners were sufficiently different from their 
mainland counterparts to have been differentiated, but the people of 
Hong Kong, along with the society, evolved into a separate identity.232 
Rather than transient populations moving in and out of Hong Kong, 
the local population began to settle after the PRC took control of the 
mainland in 1949.233 Due to political embargoes, the border between 
Hong Kong and China closed after 1950 until the 1970’s, causing a 
political culture and identity to form in Hong Kong separate from that 
of China.234 The rule of law became highly valued as the locals became 
educated, which only led to the “lawless horror” of the “near-
totalitarian political system of the PRC.”235 Tsang notes: 
By the 1970s, Hong Kong people of all ethnic origins 
had embraced the concept of the rule of law. Together 
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with the routine safeguarding of freedom in this British 
enclave these basic changes set the people of Hong 
Kong apart from the people of the PRC and produced 
the conditions for a sense of local identity based on a 
way of life and a world view different from that in the 
PRC.236 
This separate identity came with agonizing soul searching since 
the Chinese were not willing to “give up the freedom and dignity 
benefitting every human being to return to the mainland.”237 In the 
1960’s, the younger locals saw themselves as citizens of Hong Kong, 
but were still uncomfortable associating themselves with the colonial 
government.238 The true test of this new identity came in 1967 when a 
labor dispute turned into riots.239 The local communists chose the 
dispute in order to start a Cultural Revolution within Hong Kong in 
what would eventually be called “the confrontation.”240 As Maoists 
protested and rioted in the streets, tensions rose when word arose that 
Maoists planted over 8,300 suspected bombs, with over 1,400 being 
real.241 The Maoists did not win the local public’s support; the violence 
was seen as repulsive, the bombing campaign was seen as repugnant 
when bodies were spotted floating down the river, and eventually the 
local Chinese chose the stability and order that the Hong Kong 
government, though not perfect, had offered.242 
By the time of Mao’s death in 1976, even the students in local 
universities no longer celebrated the radical communist agendas, but 
instead chose to reflect upon their own cultural identity within Hong 
Kong.243 The cultural language of Cantonese became recognizably 
different from the Cantonese spoken in nearby Guangdong, and other 
cultures influenced the local Hong Kong people more than their 
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mainland counterparts.244 Through the 1980’s, television and mass 
media showcased local talent, music, and entertainment, which further 
developed a local culture and separated Hong Kong from the 
mainland.245 The new culture of society was most notably influenced 
by the U.S., Great Britain, and Japan and even Westerners living in 
Hong Kong were known as ‘belongers.’246 The government itself was 
changing too, now allowing Chinese to become government officials. 
By 1983, forty-nine percent of the directorate, the top governmental 
level in Hong Kong, were now Chinese.247 Confucianism still held 
strong within the Chinese population of Hong Kong, but modern 
Western concepts like free-speech, human rights, limited government, 
and a free economy were all incorporated into societal beliefs.248 By the 
1980’s, someone born and raised in Hong Kong would identify as from 
Hong Kong with only a minority identifying as still part of the 
mainland China.249 
3. The Sino-British Joint Declaration. 
In September 1982, the British formally met Deng Xioaping to 
discuss Hong Kong’s future.250 During the meeting, Deng Xiaoping 
stated the view that the PRC “has sovereignty over Hong Kong while 
Hong Kong has its own special position.”251 The British chose not to 
emphasize this and instead told the Hong Kong people to put their 
minds at ease.252 Margaret Thatcher met the Chinese negotiators in 
Beijing with the intention of defending the treaties that granted 
sovereignty over Hong Kong, or at least the tip of the Kowloon 
peninsula, to the British.253 After negotiations initially failed, Hong 
Kong’s population had a mixed reaction.254 Chinese nationalists and 
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communists made propaganda stating that Hong Kong locals should 
be proud to be Chinese and that the British were imperialists.255 On 
the other hand, many in Hong Kong had fled China and remembered 
the PRC’s atrocious human rights record and others had first-hand 
accounts of that history from friends and relatives.256 There was 
apparent fear at the notion of being handed over to the PRC for within 
ten days of Margaret Thatcher leaving Beijing, Hong Kong’s stock 
market dropped twenty-five percent and its dollar depreciated by 
twelve percent.257 The first round of negotiations lasted from October 
1982 until June 1983 and the PRC continuously asserted that it refused 
to accept the validity of the treaties in which Hong Kong was 
acquired.258 The PRC simply ignored that international law deemed a 
ceded territory was valid if done by a treaty.259 
In July 1983, during the second round of negotiations, the PRC 
claimed to represent the locals in Hong Kong and appointed someone 
to represent Hong Kong, despite its previous objection to the British 
attempt to do the same.260 The PRC perceived that Hong Kong was 
not involved in the negotiations for its own future.261 By September 
1984, Margaret Thatcher conceded that Britain would accept Chinese 
sovereignty over Hong Kong and Hong Kong’s return to Chinese 
control if the people of Hong Kong accepted the outcome of the 
negotiations.262 In the face of the PRC’s staunch position, Britain finally 
conceded that it would cede authority of Hong Kong after 1997.263 On 
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September 26, 1984, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was made, 
granting Hong Kong sovereignty to the PRC, a country that had 
different economic systems, different legal systems, and had been 
administered by a different government for over a century.264 The 
treaty established Hong Kong as a Special Autonomous Region 
(“SAR”) that would come under the authority of the Chinese 
government.265 The SAR was given autonomy “except in foreign and 
defense affairs.”266 Tsang wrote: 
It would keep the existing social and economic systems 
as well as the existing lifestyle, whereby ‘rights and 
freedom, including those of the person, of speech, of 
the press, of assembly, of association, of travel, of 
movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of 
occupation, of academic research and of religious 
belief will be ensured by law’. Private property, 
ownership of enterprises, legitimate rights of 
inheritance and foreign investments would also be 
protected by law.267 
The treaty also promised that the SAR and the Basic Law 
would remain unchanged for fifty years.268 The people of Hong Kong 
felt that the negotiation was acceptable, but only if it was enforced 
honestly and in full from both parties.269 After the negotiations, most 
local people of Hong Kong were afraid that “their freedom, way of 
life, and standard of living” would be changed by the PRC’s meddling 
in the domestic activities.270 The people of Hong Kong grew frustrated 
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from having no say in the negotiations and were split over whether 
they should become a democracy, become part of the power structure 
in the PRC or fight to protect their vested interests.271 The PRC had no 
intention of letting Hong Kong become a democracy and kept 
claiming that it would allow “one country, two systems.”272 In 1987, 
the Hong Kong government considered a political reform review and 
asked for the general public to submit opinions to the survey office.273 
The Survey Office released a report but lied about the actual 
findings.274 There were 125,833 individual submissions where the 
majority of the submissions supported direct elections, and 233,666 
signatures handed in through campaigns where all but 295 supported 
direct elections; the Office claimed there wasn’t support for holding 
elections in 1988.275 Britain, who was responsible for the lies released 
by the Survey Office in Hong Kong, hoped to slow down 
democratization in order to convince the PRC to allow direct elections 
by 1997, however whenever the PRC felt something threatened the 
system of government, it would be eliminated regardless of the cost.276 
The PRC would also only allow roughly forty percent of important 
committees, such as the Basic Law Drafting Committee, to be 
representatives of Hong Kong, giving an illusion of democracy with 
the PRC holding unquestionable power.277 In drafting the Basic Law, 
Article 4 states that “the socialist system and policies shall not be 
practiced in the Hong Kong Special Autonomous Region.”278 
When the student movement erupted in Beijing in 1989 the 
people of Hong Kong felt connected to it due to their frustration over 
the PRC restricting democratic movements and sidestepping the Joint 
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Declaration guidelines.279 Hong Kong staged a sympathy 
demonstration of 500,000 people, and then had another mass 
demonstration after learning of the tragic massacre at Tiananmen 
Square.280 Despite the strong calls for speeding up the democratic 
elections, and the popular opinion supporting them, Margaret 
Thatcher, fearing elections would undermine the agreement, 
responded that it “was not the time.”281 To quiet public outcry, the 
Hong Kong government, with the blessing of the PRC, introduced a 
bill of rights to incorporate the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights into Hong Kong law.282 
In the 1991 Hong Kong elections, every candidate that boasted 
a pro-PRC view was defeated, and pro-democracy candidates won 
fifteen out of the eighteen executive council seats.283 In the 1995 
elections, the PRC won only sixteen out of the sixty legislative council 
seats.284 The PRC responded by declaring the Hong Kong legislature 
would be made by appointments, which breached both the Basic Law 
and the Joint Declaration as the PRC began to meddle in the internal 
affairs of Hong Kong’s governance.285 In December of 1996, the 
provisional council was finally selected with thirty-three of the sixty 
seats to be held by the existing council.286 Following the handover of 
power in 1997, the new head of Hong Kong changed the government’s 
approached from the hands-off style to “actively managing new 
economic or social developments,” showing an immediate sudden 
shift to the PRC’s authoritative style.287 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A.   Tibet 
1. Main International Law Argument for Sovereignty 
Under international law, qualifying as a state requires passing a 
four-prong test: The state must (1) have a defined territory, (2) contain 
a permanent population, (3) be under control of its own governance, 
and (4) have the capacity to engage in formal relations with other 
states.288 At the time the PRC invaded Tibet, the government of Tibet 
satisfied all four of these conditions.289 The territory of Tibet, though 
sometimes expanding and contracting depending upon the treaty, was 
defined through several treaties with Britain, India, and even the ROC 
while they controlled China.290 The areas known as Outer Tibet, Kham 
(also called Eastern Tibet and Inner Tibet), and Amdo (Northern 
Tibet) have historically been part of the Tibetan state and under the 
governance of Lhasa.291 Even under the rule of the Qing dynasty, 
boundaries of Tibet were defined as Tibet, Kham, and Amdo, with the 
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governing council (the Khashag) set up for self-governance.292 
Although the Tibetan region contained many Nomads, the population 
of Tibet was mostly a permanent population based upon a pre-
modern, theocratic society with a spiritual leader as the head of state.293 
Tibet had one of the largest populations of monastic devotion in the 
world (as a percentage of the population), all of which are considered 
a permanent population.294 The government in Lhasa was autonomous, 
levying and collecting taxes, raising and maintaining a military, issuing 
passports, and maintaining the peace.295 The Tibetan government also 
engaged in foreign relations with other states during its period of self-
governance, including the Convention between Great Britain, China, 
and Tibet, (July 3, 1914), the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance 
Between the Government of Mongolia and Tibet (Dec. 29, 1912), the 
Convention Between Great Britain and Tibet (September 7, 1904), the 
Treaty Between Nepal and Tibet (March 1956), and the Peace Treaty 
Between Ladakh and Tibet at Tingmosgang (1684).296 Tibet satisfied all 
four requirements and was a state under the legal system of 
international law at the time it was invaded by the PRC.297 
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The Restatement (third) of The Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States differs slightly from the Montevideo convention, 
requiring other states to treat the entity as a state for solidification of 
the state’s recognition.298 The restatement says that a “state is formally 
recognized by other states . . . but a decision to treat an entity as a state 
may be manifested in other ways.”299 The British recognized the 
sovereignty of Tibet through the ratification of several treaties.300 The 
Chinese had implicitly recognized Tibet as a sovereign through various 
treaties and negotiations with the Tibetan government during its 
existence.301 Mongolia, Nepal, and Ladakh all signed treaties 
recognizing Tibetan sovereignty as well, along with a trade mission 
received by the United States from Tibet, all of which satisfy the 
restatements requirement.302 Further, even during a military 
occupation, a state does not terminate statehood.303 Since Tibet’s 
territory was unlawfully annexed under the United Nations charter, 
through the use or threat of use of force, Tibet’s statehood was not 
terminated.304 
Many academics believe that China is not going to agree to 
recognize the right of Tibet to independence, or even that Tibet has a 
right to greater autonomy.305 Due to China’s brazen disrespect of 
international law in invading Tibet and its staunch stance on Tibet’s 
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status, the prospect of “remedial right only” theory is necessary to be 
discussed.306 Under the “remedial right only” theory, a group of people 
have the right to “secede only if the physical survival of its members is 
threatened by the actions of the state; it suffers from violations of other 
human rights; or its previously sovereign territory was unjustly taken 
by the state.”307 As one commentator notes in discussing the possible 
options for Quebec, “the biggest drawback to this theory is the likely 
need for armed uprisings to begin the secession process.”308 
Tibet needs to secede from Chinese rule in order to guarantee 
the survival of its ethnic population.309 China has been encouraging 
Han Chinese to move to Tibet in the past thirty years in a greater 
attempt to solidify its sovereignty over Tibet.310 The large influx of Han 
Chinese in Tibet even caused riots by Tibetans in 2008.311 Furthermore, 
the PRC has encouraged Han Chinese to intermarry with Tibetans 
over the past decade, causing so-called “mixed marriages” to grow 
from 666 marriages in 2008 to 4,795 marriages in 2013.312 Not only 
have Han Chinese been encouraged to move to Tibet, and intermarry 
with Tibetans, but the Chinese government has continued to destroy 
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Tibetan homes, structures, and cultural centers.313 Chinese officials also 
ordered monasteries and schools not to teach the Tibetan language.314 
The Chinese government is committing cultural genocide, which 
makes secession from China the only way to ensure that the Tibetan 
culture, Tibetan ethnicity, and the Tibetan language survives; the 
horrific actions of China satisfy the requirement for the “remedial right 
only theory,” and the uprisings by the Tibetans against the Chinese 
further shows the need for secession.315 
2. Alternative Routes to Sovereignty 
In 1928, the Permanent Court of Arbitration defined the 
necessary qualities to claim title to a territory.316 Title to territory 
requires “the continuous and peaceful display of territorial 
sovereignty,” which is “as good as title.”317 This concept to claim a 
territory that has not been continuously held is called prescriptive 
title.318 In a dispute over sovereignty of land, title by means of 
prescriptive title requires that “the possession must be peaceful and 
uninterrupted”319 As shown in the preceding paragraph, it is impossible 
for China to claim sovereignty over Tibet as Tibet had possession over 
the Tibetan Autonomous Region, Kham, and Amdo during the reign 
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of the ROC, which was peaceful and uninterrupted during the 1912-
1950 reign of the Lhasa government in Tibet.320 There is no historical 
period in which Tibet was ruled by China prior to 1951.321 China cannot 
claim sovereignty over Tibet as it did not hold Tibet peacefully, nor 
uninterrupted.322 
According to international law, a state may establish its title to 
territory by showing the government is the successor to a preceding 
state which has since dissolved or disappeared.323 In October of 1949, 
the People’s Republic of China took control of the Chinese 
government.324 The PRC succeeded the Republic of China, which did 
not have control, nor sovereignty over Tibet, Kham, or Amdo.325 The 
PRC became the successor state, causing the PRC to inherit all former 
treaties signed by the previous governments as well as the obligations 
under international law, to the United Nations, and to bordering 
states.326 Since the PRC inherited the treaties of the ROC, the PRC 
inherited all treaties made with Tibet, including the recognition of 
borders.327 Therefore, China had an international obligation to respect 
Tibet’s territorial borders.328 
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In the early twentieth century, several treaties and declarations 
revealed an emerging norm of customary international law: 
delegitimizing aggression.329 The creation of the League of Nations, the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the “Stimson Doctrine” of 1932, and 
Article 2 section 4 of the U.N. Charter all denounced and prohibited 
the threat or use of force.330 The Republic of China was a signatory to 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, a founding member of the League of 
Nations, and a founding member of the United Nations.331 As the PRC 
succeeded the ROC, and since China was a member of the United 
Nations when it invaded the sovereign nation of Tibet in 1950, the use 
of force was an illegal action under international law and all territories 
acquired due to the PRC’s use of force should not be recognized as 
part of China’s territory.332 
International law, as recognized in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties in 1969, establishes that a “treaty is void if its 
conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation 
of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations.”333 As Professor Robert Sloane of Boston University 
School of Law stated, “illegal occupation cannot itself determine 
statehood.”334 The International Law Committee, a group of legal 
experts commissioned to codify existing norms of international law, 
stated in the 1966 report: 
The traditional doctrine prior to the covenant of the 
League of Nations was that the validity of a treaty was 
not affected by the fact that it had been brought about 
by the threat or use of force. However, this doctrine 
was simply a reflection of the general attitude of 
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international law during that era towards the legality of 
the use of force for the settlement of international 
disputes. With the Covenant and the Pact of Paris there 
began to develop a strong body of opinion which held 
that such treaties should no longer be recognized as 
legally valid. The endorsement of the criminality of 
aggressive war in the Charters of the Allied Military 
Tribunals for the trial of the Axis War criminals, the 
clear cut prohibition of the threat or use of force in 
Article 2, section 4 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, together with the practice of the United 
Nations itself, have reinforced and consolidated this 
development in the law. The Commission considers 
that these developments justify the conclusion that the 
invalidity of a treaty procured by the illegal threat or 
use of force is a principle which is lex lata in the 
international law of today.335 
When the Tibetan delegation agreed to the seventeen-point 
agreement with China, the agreement was void due to three main 
reasons: (1) because Tibet was under attack at the time, (2) because the 
Tibetan delegation was coerced into signing the document, and (3) 
because the Tibetan delegation was not authorized to make 
concessions that they made.336 The Security Council of the United 
Nations voted that North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June of 
1950 constituted a breach of the peace and was against international 
law.337 The sovereignty of South Korea, and the sovereignty of states 
in general, was such a firmly held belief in the Security Council that it 
asked for other UN members to assist South Korea just two days after 
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the condemnation.338 The conquest of territory by the threat or use of 
force was further shown to be contrary to international law when the 
Security Council of the UN condemned the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 
in 1990.339 It seems likely that had the UN recognized Tibet as a 
sovereign state in 1949, the other members of the Security Council, 
aside from China, would have condemned China’s invasion and 
subsequent use of force as well.340 Since Tibet should have been 
considered an independent sovereign state, and since the seventeen-
point treaty was invalid due to the threat and actual use of force, there 
are no valid treaties which grant the PRC sovereignty over Tibet.341 
Tibet should be considered a non-self-governing territory as 
defined by the United Nations and China has a duty to promote self-
governance within Tibet.342 Tibet is a non-self-governing territory since 
the PRC formally dissolved the Tibetan government in 1959 and split 
the territory of Tibet across several provinces.343 Since Tibet is a non-
self-governing territory, the 1960 UN Declaration on Granting 
Independence to Colonial Countries should apply to Tibet as well.344 
Tibet should therefore be given three options in accordance to G.A. 
1541: (1) to become an independent state, (2) to become associated 
with another state, or (3) to fully integrate with another state.345 
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The PRC has committed a wide array of human rights 
violations in Tibet.346 An Australian Human Rights delegation entered 
China in July 1991 with the intention of gauging the issues facing 
Tibet.347 Although the delegation felt as if they were being insulated 
from the general population, the delegation was still able to find “clear 
signs of anti-Chinese feelings.”348 The local Tibetans that spoke to the 
delegation “were unequivocal about the lack of religious freedom and 
civil and political rights” and went on to mention a “lack of justice, 
education, employment, and freedom of expression, as well as 
restrictions on movement.”349 The United Nations’ Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights created international legal norms, which 
include protections from arbitrary arrests, protection from systemic 
racial discrimination, the right of freedom of movement, freedom of 
religion, the right to education, and protection from torture.350 Between 
1987 and July 1991, the delegation learned that fifty people had been 
sentenced for “counter-revolutionary” crimes, with two executions 
happening in 1990 alone.351 Sources suggest that over one thousand 
prisoners were sentenced for political reasons in Lhasa at the time the 
delegation had visited.352 China showed blatant disregard for 
international law by stripping the Tibetans of their rights, conveyed to 
them by the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights.353 The 
conclusion the Australian delegation came to was that “a serious 
human rights problem exists in Tibet” and that it was “clear that China 
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continues not to tolerate political opposition and dissent in Tibet.”354 
When the delegation suggested that peace talks take place between 
Beijing and the Dalai Lama, China claimed that “no Tibetan wants a 
return to Feudalism,” despite the delegation having been told the 
opposite when they spoke to Tibetans upon their visit.355 The views of 
the Tibetans that were shared with the Australian delegation show that 
Tibet would choose to be an independent state if the local population 
were asked.356 In accordance with General Assembly resolution 1541 
and confirmed by the ICJ’s decision on the Chagos Islands, Tibet 
should have the choice to vote for its own future.357 
In conclusion, Tibet has the right to self-determination, China 
has no claim over Tibet, nor did China have uninterrupted control over 
Tibet necessary to establish sovereignty, and the treaty which granted 
China sovereignty over Tibet is void due to the use of force and the 
threat of force.358 China must also abide by international law and cease 
to use force or the threat of force to coerce Tibet into further 
treaties.359 Furthermore, the People’s Republic of China must also 
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recognize the last treaty, which grants the Lhasa government and the 
Dalai Lama control over Tibet, Kham, and Amdo.360 
B.   Hong Kong 
Hong Kong, despite being under colonial rule for most of its 
existence, has most of the qualifications to be considered an 
independent state.361 The two treaties of Nanking and Peking in the 
nineteenth century, along with the 1898 lease of the New Territories 
give Hong Kong a defined territory.362 The local administration of 
Hong Kong was self-governing throughout its colonial rule.363 Finally, 
Hong Kong had a permanent population, satisfying three of the four 
necessary qualities of a sovereign state.364 Hong Kong currently lacks 
the ability to enter into treaties with other states, but had it not been 
under the colonial rule of Britain and then under China’s rule, it would 
have been able to do so.365 Due to its unique population, defined 
territory, and ability to self-govern, Hong Kong should be considered 
an independent state with full autonomy.366 
Hong Kong was a colony of Great Britain from the time of the 
Nanking Treaty until the handover to China in 1997.367 In 1960, the 
United Nations passed the General Resolution for the Declaration on 
Granting Independence to Colonial Countries (resolution 1514), 
which should have granted Hong Kong the option for independence 
prior to the handover.368 Resolution 1514 was confirmed as being 
customary international law by the International Court of Justice in 
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their advisory opinion on the Chagos islands.369 Since the 1960 
resolution 1514 is seen as customary international law, Britain was 
under a legal obligation to grant all colonies, including Hong Kong, 
independence.370 In November 1972, the UN General Assembly voted 
to remove Hong Kong from the official list of colonies at the behest 
of China.371 The removal of Hong Kong from the list of colonies was 
to ensure China would regain possession of Hong Kong in 1997.372 
Hong Kong should still be considered a colony, first of Britain then of 
China, since it has the qualifications of an independent separate state 
but was under the control of a colonial power.373 Therefore, Hong 
Kong, as a colony, should be granted the right of self-determination, 
and should have been granted self-determination after resolution 1514 
was passed.374 
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The international legal principle of self-determination was 
solidified into law under the U.N. charter, in Article 1, section 2, and 
Article 55 and continued to be implemented into many U.N. 
resolutions thereafter.375 The principle of self-determination was also 
embedded into the UN Declaration on Granting Independence to 
Colonial Countries.376 Since Hong Kong was a colony of Britain at the 
time of the UN Declaration, the declaration should be applied to Hong 
Kong.377 Since Hong Kong was a colony, and the UN Declaration 
applied to it, Britain did not have the authority to grant sovereignty 
over Hong Kong, only Hong Kong can decide if it wants to give its 
sovereignty away to China.378 Resolution 1541 states that all colonies, 
also called non-self-governing territories in the UN, can reach full self-
governance by choosing to (1) become an independent state, (2) 
become associated with another state, or (3) fully integrate with 
another state, but it is a decision that the colony must choose.379 Since 
Hong Kong did not choose to become integrated with China, the Sino-
British Joint Declaration should be voided, and Hong Kong should be 
given the choices stated in resolution 1541.380 
The Umbrella movement, also called the Umbrella Revolution, 
was a series of pro-democracy protests in 2014 that attracted tens of 
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thousands of Hong Kong locals.381 The Chinese government 
responded to the protests with violence, many protestors were beaten 
and arrested.382 Since two conditions of the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration were to allow Hong Kong to have “executive, legislative, 
and independent judicial power including that of final adjudication,” 
and to allow the current system to remain unchanged for fifty years, 
China has not performed its obligations under the treaty due to its 
suppression of the Umbrella movement.383 Further, China has become 
increasingly totalitarian under the rule of Xi Jinping.384 The totalitarian 
rule, and the diminishment of Hong Kong’s reputation as China’s 
freest city, is a direct violation of the treaty granting China sovereignty 
over Hong Kong.385 
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Ni Jian, the Chinese deputy Ambassador to Britain stated that 
the Joint Declaration “is now void and only covered from the signing 
in 1984 until the handover in 1997.”386 According to Michael Davis, a 
law professor at Hong Kong University, the obligation to Hong Kong 
and the British under the Sino-British Joint Declaration “cannot 
possibly be fulfilled until the 50 years pass.”387 China has violated the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration treaty by banning political parties, 
blocking people from running for elections, and even denied 
individuals from opening a bank account.388 According to Article 69 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, if acts have been 
performed in reliance of a treaty that has since been voided, “each 
party may require any other party to establish as far back as possible in 
their mutual relations the position that would have existed if the acts 
had not been performed.”389 The reason Britain gave Hong Kong’s 
sovereignty to Beijing was due to the promises made in the Joint 
Declaration, and to void the joint declaration would mean returning 
Hong Kong’s governance to Britain.390 The Chinese ceded Hong Kong 
Island and part of Kowloon peninsula to the British under legal 
treaties, the British developed the area into one of the world’s leading 
economies and had no international nor legal obligation to hand over 
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Hong Kong’s sovereignty to China.391 China has no valid treaties that 
grant it sovereignty over Tibet nor Hong Kong, which means both are 
illegal occupations.392 Since Hong Kong is under an illegal occupation, 
just as was stated for Tibet, an “illegal occupation cannot itself 
determine statehood.”393 
C.   Hong Kong is Tibet’s Past and Tibet is Hong Kong’s Future 
When analyzing the history of Tibet and the modern issues 
surrounding Hong Kong, similarities begin to emerge, which give the 
strong impression that Tibet’s past is Hong Kong’s future.394 The 
People’s Republic of China has a history of implementing radical 
changes slowly over time.395 Mao Zedong first told the Tibetans there 
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would be no class struggle, but after 1956 the message morphed to 
“the unending class struggle between the serfs’ landlords must be a 
peaceful one,” and within three modifications of this message Mao 
changed it to “all landlords are enemies of the people. They are like 
rotten meat. If we do not destroy the meat, it will always smell and 
collect flies.”396 Similarly, in 1956, the message of religion from Mao 
was “freedom of religion must be respected,” which eventually 
morphed to “freedom of religion is only for individuals, no 
organizations may be created for religious reasons,” until the final 
message was “Religion is the opium of the people. All monks and 
lamas are exploiters and enemies of the people. The Red [clergy] and 
Black [aristocracy] enemies must be eliminated.”397 The seventeen-
point agreement promised not to alter the existing political system in 
Tibet, nor change any of the functions or powers of the Dalai Lama, 
and yet within months de facto autonomy was taken from Tibet, and the 
Dalai Lama was forced to flee with 80,000 other Tibetans.398 Almost 
immediately after the Chinese troops arrived in Lhasa, the authority of 
the Dalai Lama and existing political structure was undermined.399 
Despite the PRC’s promise to not change the status, functions, and 
powers of the Lhasa government, the territory of Tibet was then 
divided into Tibet, Qinghai, Szechuan, and Yunnan.400 The Tibetan 
government was formally dissolved on March 28th, 1959.401 This is 
similar to the promise made by the PRC to allow Hong Kong’s system 
to remain unchanged for fifty years.402 In the aftermath of the 1959 
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uprising in Tibet, Tibetan currency was banned, private trade became 
restricted, freedom of movement was restricted, Tibetans were 
subjected to propaganda by the Chinese communists, while monastic 
officials were arrested and sent to labor camps.403 In Hong Kong, 
China has banned political parties from being officially registered, and 
banned the members from running for office.404 Banning political 
parties is a small step towards authoritarianism in Hong Kong and is a 
violation of human rights that were guaranteed to the Hong Kong 
people.405 The changes were not sudden in Tibet, and began with less 
harsh language, but eventually evolved to radical language, encouraging 
violence against the landlords and monks.406 As the leader of the Hong 
Kong National Party said, Beijing is Hong Kong’s “colonial master,” 
and China poses “a threat to all free peoples in the world.”407 
Tibet was promised it would keep the political and religious 
systems; Hong Kong was promised fifty years for retaining its 
governing system.408 Both states saw these promises broken within 
years of the agreements.409 After the official handover of power of 
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Hong Kong in 1997, the new governor of Hong Kong announced a 
more active governing approaching, which is a distinct difference from 
the British laissez-faire, or ‘hands off,’ style.410 From the 1997 declaration 
that the elected positions would be appointments from the 
government, to claiming the Joint Sino-British Declaration to be void, 
to the violence seen in the wake of the Umbrella movement, China has 
been systematically becoming more authoritarian towards Hong 
Kong.411 With each step the PRC takes towards authoritarian solutions 
in Hong Kong, there is a direct reflection of the gradual authoritative 
steps taken in Tibet during the 1950’s.412 Tibet’s language has slowly 
been disappearing due to the government banning schools and 
monasteries from teaching Tibetan; Hong Kong is beginning to see a 
similar tactic being implemented with the city government encouraging 
“students to become . . . trilingual in English, Cantonese, and 
Mandarin.”413 After Mao’s death, the same authoritative mentality 
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continued into Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the PRC during the 
Tiananmen Square incident, a violent suppression of a student-led 
protest in June 1989.414 Xi Jinping has taken the same authoritative tone 
when dealing with the Umbrella movement, sending “a warning to the 
pro-independence or other so-called anti-China elements to not 
challenge the authority of the central government.”415 Hong Kong 
should look toward Tibet’s past, in the slow evolution of restrictions 
and authoritative handling in order to see where its own future lies.416 
Although China will claim “one country, two systems,” there 
is only one government allowed in China, and that authoritative 
government is the central government of Beijing.417 
D.   Political Viability 
Xi Jinping became the leader of the PRC between 2012 and 
2013.418 From his first actions in jailing Chinese communist party 
leaders for corruption, to his bold moves to reorganize the military, 
and aggressive economic agenda, Xi has consolidated power in 
China.419 Chinese scholars have called Xi an “emperor” and have said 
the decision-making process in the Politburo Standing Committee is 
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“Xi’s one man show.”420 Although Chinese historian Cheng Li believes 
it is too early to make a judgement on Xi Jinping’s intentions on 
domestic and foreign issues, since Xi is currently leading the PRC we 
must analyze his leadership style and reactions to domestic issues to 
gauge the political possibilities surrounding Tibetan, and Hong 
Kongese, sovereignty.421 
As aforementioned, Xi Jinping regained the Chinese public’s 
confidence when first taking office by launching a bold anti-corruption 
campaign.422 Despite the ubiquitous corruption within the Chinese 
Communist Party (“CCP”), Xi rallied continued CCP rule while jailing 
senior CCP members.423 This duality of both prosecuting party leaders 
while promoting continued party rule shows how difficult it is to 
predict Xi’s response as the two are seemingly contradictive.424 Further, 
Xi came from a privileged party family, but his father was purged by 
Mao in the 1960’s which caused his family to suffer hardship in a rural 
area.425 Xi’s initiatives crack down on State-owned enterprise 
monopolies while promoting China’s national champions, the very 
State-owned enterprises he promises to crack down on.426 Xi continues 
with a conservative governance style that alienates liberal intellectuals, 
while simultaneously prioritizing the development and promotion of 
think tanks to create liberal intellectuals as a national strategic 
objective.427 All of these are direct contradictions, highlight the 
difficulty in analyzing Xi and guessing his future policy decisions.428 
The contradictions do point towards the qualities of a leader who is 
not dogmatic, nor a zealot, but instead a flexible and adaptable leader 
who can bend with the wind.429 
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Zhang Lifan, a Chinese historian, has argued that Xi’s goal is 
to be “as strong as Vladimir Putin when dealing with domestic and 
foreign affairs.”430 Xi also firmly opposes ethnic and religious demands 
for autonomy.431 However, changes within Chinese society may soon 
push Xi towards changing his policies yet again.432 The middle class is 
growing in China, as well as a growth in interest group politics, and 
constitutional demands from the legal community may push Xi to 
political reforms.433 Further, China is in transition from being a regional 
power to a global power, now ranked as the second largest economy 
on earth.434 With China becoming a global entity, the opinion of the 
international community will become more important to the decision 
within China to secure trade and maintain peaceful relations.435 The 
United States holds a great deal of power with China due to the 
interdependence between the two countries in terms of economy and 
trade.436 If Xi is a flexible and adaptive leader as is suggested, 
international and domestic pressure could create an opportunistic 
situation for both Tibet and Hong Kong.437 
There are other indicators that Xi Jinping believes in “national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity” and promotes these ideas heavily 
within China.438 The conflict of the South China Sea, where China built 
upon small uninhabited islands to claim ownership of the entire sea, 
shows that Xi will not cease its actions to maintain its perceived 
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sovereignty over the South China Sea.439 When also viewing the US 
interests in the Korean peninsula, coupled with the U.S. performing 
“freedom of navigation operations” in the South China Sea, the 
conflict between the U.S. and China seems inevitable.440 As Dr. Teng 
Jianqun of the China Institute of International Studies wrote, “[t]he 
U.S. perception of China as a ‘strategic competitor’ will surely bring 
frictions and conflicts to the bilateral relations, but China has to keep 
calm, searching out more opportunities for cooperation and make 
unremitting efforts to maintain stability of the relationship.”441 With 
conflict seeming to be in the future, the United States could use its 
superior economy and relationships in the international community to 
create pressure and liberate the occupied areas in Tibet and Hong 
Kong. 
III.   CONCLUSION 
China has violated international law in both the treatment of 
the Hong Kongese after the Sino-British Joint Declaration, and in the 
illegal annexation of Tibet in 1950.442 The United States and the 
European Union, along with all other members of the U.N. are 
obligated under international law not to contribute to China’s violation 
of international law.443 The obligation of international law is satisfied if 
the U.S. and the other members of the U.N. side with the victims.444 
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Lea Brilmayer, professor of Yale University and New York University, 
argued that there are two different means of supporting international 
law: direct support of international law where the state obliges in all 
dealings with other countries, and indirect support where the state 
respects international law by basing its positions on disputes between 
states on what international law requires.445 Professor Brilmayer further 
makes the case for third parties to enforce international law, stating: 
[A] powerful State’s greatest contribution to 
international law occurs through pressure or 
persuasion directed towards other States’ conduct, 
rather than through the direct effect of its own 
compliance . . . Powerful States, including the United 
States, have an important effect on international law 
when they evenhandedly pressure or cajole less 
powerful States to comply. Purporting to act as global 
hegemon, the United States has a moral obligation to 
use its authority consistently and for the good of the 
international community.446 
Under this doctrine, every powerful state on earth has the 
obligation to put pressure on China and Xi Jinping in order to enforce 
international law for the freedom of both Tibet and Hong Kong.447 
Since the annexation of Tibet by China could be seen as territorial 
expansion taken through a war of aggression, this violates the highest 
level of international law; jus cogens, or preemptory norm.448 Jus cogens 
norm is not permitted to be derogated from.449 The International Law 
Commissions articles on State Responsibility provides that “States 
shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious 
breach” of jus cogens norms, and “[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a 
situation created by a serious breach . . . , nor render aid or assistance 
in maintaining that situation.”450 Until China grants Hong Kong and 
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Tibet the three options listed under the U.N. General Assembly 
resolution 1541, all states in the U.N. have an obligation to pressure 
China with the means at their disposal.451 The U.N. Security Council 
has the means to decide when an act is threatening international 
peace.452 Since China is a member of the Security Council, the Security 
Council will not likely resolve the conflict, which will leave it in the 
hands of the states with the greatest power, namely the United States 
and the European Union.453 
Since Xi Jinping is a flexible leader and reacts to each situation 
accordingly, and because the U.N. will be rendered impotent on the 
matter, the United States should join with the European Union to 
make a “trade embargo” with China until it complies with international 
law.454 
Inaction in the past should not justify inaction in the future. 
History is littered with the dead bodies of the innocent, who fell 
waiting in hope for a miracle to occur from someone or something 
powerful enough to end the injustice. A cultural genocide is slowly 
being implemented in Tibet, while the cry for self-governance is 
suffocated in Hong Kong. Every moment we wait, the horror 
continues for millions. To continue to sit in a state of apathy or 
inaction is an act of cowardice and shows a lack of conscience. 
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